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Chapter 9
‘Indigenous peoples are not 
multicultural minorities’
Cultural diversity, heritage and 
Indigenous human rights in Australia
Michele Langfield
Despite the existence of international instruments to safeguard fundamental 
human rights, specific rights of Indigenous peoples worldwide remain inade-
quately protected. Governments have practised enforced assimilation and 
varying degrees of ethnocide and genocide, including massacres, child 
removal, and eradication of culture, spirituality and languages (Havemann 
1999a: 2–6; Tickner 2001: 2). Indigenous peoples are still severely disad-
vantaged according to social indicators such as detention rates, homelessness, 
unemployment, health, life expectancy, alcohol and substance abuse, 
domestic violence, discrimination and exploitation (University of Minnesota 
2003).
 This chapter interrogates these issues in the Australian indigenous setting 
focussing on interconnections between cultural diversity, heritage and 
human rights. The first section addresses the terminology. The second pro-
vides a brief comparative background on British settler societies. The inter-
national human rights context for Indigenous peoples is then charted, before 
the discussion moves to the Australian experience, especially since the 
1970s. Finally, it examines Australia’s response to the United Nations Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly in 
September 2007. Arguably, the change of national government in Australia 
in November 2007 ushered in a period of qualitatively different relations 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.
Defining indigeneity
Multiple descriptors (Indigenous ‘people’, ‘peoples’, ‘populations’ and ‘First 
Nations’) evoke different responses, including government fears of secession 
and ‘nations within’. Confusion exists about who can legitimately claim 
indigeneity, who is accepted, and who can speak for whom. While there is 
no single definition, there are particular criteria by which Indigenous peoples 
are identified. The International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention no. 
169 considers people as Indigenous either because they are descendants of 
those who inhabited the area before colonization or have maintained their 
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own social, economic, cultural and political institutions since colonization 
and the establishment of new states (IWGIA 2008).
 In the Martinéz-Cobo Report to the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination of Minorities (1986), Indigenous communities, peoples and 
nations are identified as those which
having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial socie-
ties that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from 
other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts 
of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are 
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their 
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their con-
tinued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural pat-
terns, social institutions and legal systems.
(IWGIA 2008; Fletcher 1999: 337)
This is the generally accepted ‘working definition’ of Indigenous peoples. 
Self-identification and acceptance by the group are crucial, as in the ILO 
Convention.
 Another approach by Erica-Irene Daes, Chairperson, UN Working Group 
on Indigenous Populations, is also widely used. Daes identifies peoples as 
Indigenous:
1 because they are descendants of groups already in the country when 
other ethnic or cultural groups arrived there;
2 because of their isolation from other segments of the population, they 
have preserved almost intact the customs and traditions of their ances-
tors; and
3 because they are, even if only formally, placed under a state structure 
which incorporates national, social and cultural characteristics alien to 
theirs (IWGIA 2008).
Indigenous peoples share a history of injustice where colonization has 
removed their dignity, identity and fundamental rights to self-determina-
tion. According to Augie Fleras:
Indigeneity, as principle and practice, is concerned ultimately with 
restructuring the contractual basis of indigenous-State relations. It 
moves away from the colonization of the past towards recognition of 
First Peoples as distinct societies whose collective and inherent rights to 
jurisdictional self-determination over land, identity and political voice 
have never been extinguished but serve as grounds for entitlement and 
engagement with the state. The politicization of this indigeneity is inex-
tricably linked with its manifestation in indigenous ethno-politics.
(Fleras 1999: 192)
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‘Indigenous peoples are not multicultural minorities’  137
This chapter adopts the meaning of indigeneity as discourse and in its 
recently politicized form.
Indigenous peoples in British settler societies
There are 350 to 500 million Indigenous individuals worldwide, divided 
into 5,000 peoples, constituting 80 per cent of the world’s cultural and bio-
logical diversity, and occupying 20 per cent of its land (University of Min-
nesota 2003). Australia, Canada and New Zealand all have histories of 
migration superimposed on pre-existing Indigenous populations which share 
the experience of ‘subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion and 
discrimination by the dominant society’ (Havemann 1999a: 5–6). Early 
British settlers were relatively homogeneous compared with the cultural 
diversity of those displaced. Nation building was based on racism and capit-
alism, contrasting with traditional Indigenous subsistence practices of sus-
tainability and close spiritual relationships with the land.
 Australian Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders represent 500 com-
munities, speak 170 languages and have their own flags. They number 
approximately 450,000, 2 per cent of Australia’s population of 20 million 
(ABS 2006). Inuit, Indian and Métis are recognized as First Nations in 
Canada. Ten language groups and 40 tribes exist, comprising some 1.3 
million people, 4.4 per cent of the population (Statistics Canada, Aboriginal 
Peoples of Canada 2001). In New Zealand, English and Ma¯ori share official 
language status. Ma¯ori number approximately 500,000, 15 per cent of New 
Zealand’s population, with 40 distinct tribal groups (Havemann 1999a: 2–6; 
Statistics New Zealand 2006). Although these Indigenous populations are 
increasing faster than non-Indigenous, they remain greatly outnumbered.
 Factors affecting race relations and human rights in settler societies 
include the density, distribution and comparative isolation of Indigenous 
peoples; their leadership structures and degree of diversity; the timing and 
nature of European settlement; the imposition of Western notions of citizen-
ship and sovereignty; the ability of traditional societies to resist or adapt; the 
influence of Christian missionaries; the existence of treaties; and the effects 
of ‘dispersion’, segregation, ‘protection’ and assimilation. In all three coun-
tries, Indigenous populations were reduced to dispossessed and underprivi-
leged minorities by the late nineteenth century (Fisher 1980).
 Since the 1970s, multiculturalism has underpinned public policy in Aus-
tralia and Canada, whereas bi-culturalism prevails in New Zealand (Have-
mann 1999a: 10). This difference in the management of cultural diversity 
partly explains the less disadvantaged position of Ma¯ori compared with 
Australian Aborigines and Canadian Indians. Nonetheless, all three socie-
ties  have a history of imposing monoculturalism through assimilation, mar-
ginalizing Indigenous peoples based on the ideology of scientific racism. 
From an Indigenous perspective, this is tantamount to cultural genocide. 
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Only recently has cultural diversity been managed by enabling limited self-
determination and recognizing some ‘way of life’ and cultural rights (Have-
mann 1999c: 331).
International human rights and Indigenous peoples
Indigenous peoples’ rights in international law have changed markedly over 
time. Since the 1970s, the emphasis has shifted from assimilation to greater 
recognition of their right to remain separate with their own distinctive iden-
tities. This shift is particularly relevant to the theme of this chapter, which 
argues that Indigenous peoples have special rights, over and above cultural 
minorities within nations in general. How has this evolution in international 
human rights law affected British settler societies, especially Australia? 
While these societies have many similarities, they also display differences 
affecting the manner and extent to which international developments are 
locally incorporated.
 Traditionally, only states could be subjects of international law. By the 
nineteenth century, customs of natural law recognizing Indigenous 
peoples as deserving of rights were replaced by state-made laws, reducing 
their legal status. The principle of terra nullius held that Indigenous 
peoples had no land tenure or land law at the time of British settlement 
and consequently the Crown could claim sovereignty. ‘Protection’ policies 
aimed to assimilate Indigenous peoples who had no international legal status 
until the mid-twentieth century (Tickner 2001: 4). Human rights law grad-
ually evolved, however, allowing Indigenous peoples at least to become 
objects of international concern, initially for their protection and later to 
promote self-determination. Awareness of their living conditions spread and 
international standards provided them with moral support to fight for their 
rights (Havemann 1999b: 183–4; Iorns Magallanes 1999: 236–7; Fletcher 
1999: 339).
 The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) was the first inter-
national instrument to assert that all people were equal in dignity and rights 
(Article 1), irrespective of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status 
(Article 2). The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Gen-
ocide (1951) followed, defining genocide as acts intended to destroy, totally 
or partially, a national, racial or religious group, including the forcible trans-
fer of children of one group to another. The first international agency to 
address Indigenous issues specifically was the ILO. In 1957 it adopted Con-
vention No. 107 and Recommendation No. 104 ‘Concerning the Protection 
of Indigenous Populations within Independent Countries’. This reaffirmed 
that Indigenous peoples had different rights and needs from other minori-
ties, but contained no guarantee that they could remain culturally distinct 
(Iorns Magallanes 1999: 237–8).
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‘Indigenous peoples are not multicultural minorities’  139
 Human rights laws protecting minorities and individuals against dis-
crimination within states were extended in the UN Declaration (1963) and 
International Convention (1965) on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (ICERD). The ICERD, signed in 1966 by Canada, New Zealand 
and Australia and ratified in 1970, 1972 and 1975 respectively, had signific-
ant domestic ramifications (Iorns Magallanes 1999: 238). Article 1 defines 
racial discrimination as ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment, exer-
cise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life’ (ICERD).
 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) were 
adopted in 1966. The latter recognized the right to self-determination, 
becoming the ‘charter’ for post-imperial decolonization. Both protect indi-
vidual and collective rights, the ICCPR specifically mentioning intangible 
cultural heritage. Ratified by Canada in 1976, New Zealand in 1978 and 
Australia in 1980, the ICCPR has affected domestic policies in all three 
nations, particularly the frequent use by Indigenous peoples of Article 27:
In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to these minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
language.
(ICCPR)
Initially, states interpreted this as meaning not to undermine minority cul-
tures but it now implies an obligation to support them (Iorns Magallanes 
1999: 238). Although formally, the right to self-determination had no 
domestic applications, it became a means to assert indigeneity within these 
states. All ratified the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR allowing individual 
complaints against governments for breaches of the Covenant and the 
ICERD, important in Australia which has no Bill of Rights (Tickner 2001: 
302).
 The 1970s brought greater awareness of the legitimacy of Indigenous 
rights. This arose largely from Indigenous peoples themselves taking their 
concerns to the international arena which then influenced domestic laws. It 
was increasingly accepted that they be considered as distinct peoples rather 
than minorities, and legitimate objects of international law with clearly 
defined rights. Acknowledgement that they should participate in making 
decisions that affected them led to the establishment of a permanent UN 
forum (Iorns Magallanes 1999: 238–9). In 1972 a special Rapporteur was 
appointed on discrimination against Indigenous peoples and subsequent 
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reports indicate that they were of separate international concern. The Inter-
national Court of Justice in the 1975 Western Sahara case found that, under 
the laws of decolonization, Indigenous peoples were entitled to self-determi-
nation and the application of terra nullius was no longer appropriate (Have-
mann 1999b: 184). This indicated that they were being considered not only 
as legitimate objects of international law but also as subjects (Iorns Magallanes 
1999: 239). It was not until the 1992 Mabo Judgment that the Australian 
High Court rejected terra nullius in the same way.
 The establishment of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
(WGIP) by the UN Human Rights Commission in 1982 was particularly 
significant. States rejected the word ‘peoples’ (in favour of ‘populations’) 
fearing that it implied the right to self-determination. The Group’s mandate 
was to review the situation of Indigenous peoples and draft guidelines for 
their protection. A Draft Declaration was prepared between 1985 and 1993, 
the objective being to present it to the General Assembly by 2004, the last 
year of the International Decade for the World’s Indigenous Peoples. Wide 
consultation occurred and annual meetings became important platforms for 
Indigenous participation. States began to reject assimilation and accept the 
rights of Indigenous peoples to their separate culture and identity (Havemann 
1999b: 185; Iorns Magallanes 1999: 239–40; Tickner 2001: 302–5).
 Although these attitudinal shifts were reflected in international human 
rights instruments, the only legally binding document, the 1957 ILO Con-
vention No. 107, remained assimilationist. Influenced by the WGIP, the ILO 
replaced Convention No. 107 with Convention No. 169 in 1989, recognizing 
Indigenous peoples’ aspirations to cultural preservation and self-determina-
tion. Indigenous representatives, however, considered it had not gone far 
enough, giving Canada, Australia and New Zealand a convenient reason not 
to ratify or feel legally bound by it (Iorns Magallanes 1999: 240–1).
 Nonetheless, Convention No. 169 confirmed international commitment 
to Indigenous cultural self-determination, participation in decision-making 
and rights to traditional lands. It facilitated further discussion of the Draft 
Declaration establishing a minimum set of rights on which it could build. 
The final version was submitted by the sub-Commission to its parent body, 
the Commission on Human Rights, in 1994. The Commission, however, 
failed to approve it owing to state concerns about the self-determination pro-
visions and established its own Working Group on the Draft Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Iorns Magallanes 1999: 241–2; DUNDRIP 
1994). This met annually in Geneva for another decade. Indigenous repre-
sentatives from the settler societies consistently argued for a strong Declara-
tion including ‘the right of self determination’ as stated in Article 1 of the 
International Covenants. Government representatives, however, opposed this 
as it could imply the right of secession. Australia later altered its view when 
it was accepted that secession was an unlikely outcome (Iorns Magallanes 
1999: 242).
09 529 Cultural.ch09.indd   140 9/9/09   14:51:30
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
‘Indigenous peoples are not multicultural minorities’  141
 The work of the Human Rights Committee, which monitors compliance 
with the ICCPR, was particularly relevant for settler societies, making the 
following reaffirming recommendation in 1994:
Culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life 
associated with the use of land and resources, especially in the case of 
Indigenous peoples. That right may include such traditional activities as 
fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law. The 
enjoyment of these rights may require positive legal measures of protec-
tion to ensure the effective participation of members of minority com-
munities and decisions which affect them.
(Iorns Magallanes 1999: 243)
Meanwhile a UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues was being considered, 
established in 2000 with eight Indigenous members. It was the first interna-
tional UN body to have Indigenous representation and provided advice and 
recommendations to the Council. In 2001, a special Rapporteur on human 
rights and freedoms of Indigenous peoples was appointed (University of 
Minnesota 2003).
 The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was finally adopted by the 
Human Rights Council on 29 June 2006, referred to the General Assembly 
and accepted by the UN on 13 September 2007. However, the three British-
based settler societies (along with the United States) voted against it. Despite 
this rejection, these same societies have generally supported the concept of 
human rights as they have evolved internationally. All ratified the ICERD, 
the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol and use similar methods of incorporat-
ing them domestically. Although local practices vary, they are aware of their 
obligations. All have rejected assimilation and accepted a degree of self-deter-
mination (Iorns Magallanes 1999: 244–5, 264; Havemann 1999b: 185).
Australia
Historically, Australia’s relations with its Indigenous peoples were based on 
the denial of citizenship, land rights and cultural heritage. Colonization 
meant dispossession with scant recognition of international human rights. 
Aborigines became state wards, confined to reserves and missions. Until the 
1960s, assimilation underpinned Australian nationhood, exemplified by the 
white Australia policy. In 1951, as post-war immigration gathered momen-
tum, assimilation was also adopted as official policy for Aborigines (Fletcher 
1999: 341); unofficially it had existed for decades. Cultural integration was 
seen as the solution for non-British migrants and Aborigines alike. The con-
sequences, however, were devastating. According to Michael (Mick) Dodson, 
human rights activist and member of the Yawuru peoples from the southern 
Kimberley region, Western Australia:
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Assimilation was and is a massive abuse of human rights . . . human 
rights had no application to indigenous Australians in 1951 unless they 
were fully assimilated into the dominant culture. Despite the existence 
of international human rights instruments, indigenous rights did not 
inherently accrue to Aboriginal people but were, instead, a reward if 
they would renounce their Aboriginality and embrace the dominant 
status quo. It was equality based, not on respect for racial difference, but 
on the denial of your race.
(cited in Fletcher 1999: 342)
While the aim was partly to improve living conditions, assimilation also 
arose from government efforts to eliminate Aborigines as a distinctively dif-
ferent element in white Australia. As Christine Fletcher argues, governments 
collaborated in situating Aborigines ‘in a cultural vacuum’ (missions, welfare 
organizations and reserves), re-educating them as British (Fletcher 1999: 
342). Until the 1960s, states and territories had different laws and practices. 
Although Canada took over Indian affairs in 1867, and New Zealand 
assumed power over Ma¯ori affairs in 1852, no coordinated central power over 
Aborigines existed in Australia until 1967. Nonetheless, similar racist prac-
tices developed across the country (Havemann 1999c: 331).
 In contrast to Canada and New Zealand, the Australian constitution does 
not mention human rights. With federation, the Commonwealth gained 
specific powers, all other powers remaining with the states. When the Com-
monwealth legislates ‘with respect to’ one of its powers, it overrides state 
legislation (Iorns Magallanes 1999: 245–6). Aborigines only appeared in the 
Constitution in ss.127 and 51 (xxvi), the first excluding them from the 
national census, the second preventing the Commonwealth from making 
laws concerning them. It was not until the 1967 Constitutional Referendum 
that s.127 was removed and s.51 altered (Fletcher 1999: 340).
 With its overwhelming ‘yes’ vote, the 1967 Referendum was a watershed 
in the cultural and political freedoms of Aboriginal people, providing oppor-
tunities for change (Fletcher 1999: 335–6). Many individuals and organiza-
tions influenced this outcome, particularly the Federal Council for the 
Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (Taffe 2005; Tickner 
2001: 5, 8–9). On Australia Day 1972, a ‘tent embassy’ was erected outside 
old Parliament House, Canberra, flying the Aboriginal flag, a symbol of sov-
ereignty reflecting the growing unity of Indigenous Australians in the strug-
gle for their rights (Tickner 2001: 11; Wells 2000: 212). Multiculturalism 
became official policy in 1973 followed by the 1975 Racial Discrimination 
Act (RDA), signalling the end of legal discrimination on the basis of race. 
The RDA established a ‘non-negotiable foundation of human rights protec-
tion’, giving effect to the ICERD. Without it, the Mabo decision might 
never have happened since it requires that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
land rights are treated equally (Tickner 2001: 16, 83, 85).
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‘Indigenous peoples are not multicultural minorities’  143
 The Indigenous population has since grown substantially, their leaders 
and spokespeople increasingly acknowledged. Living standards have 
improved but are still well below those of other Australians. There is no con-
stitutional recognition of Aboriginal rights as First Peoples, so reforms of 
one government can be revoked by the next (Fletcher 1999: 341, 347–8). 
Australian states and territories have passed equal opportunity and anti-dis-
crimination laws benefiting all, but Aborigines have relied primarily on the 
Commonwealth for justice (Tickner 2001: 5). Under its external affairs 
power, the Commonwealth has used international human rights law to gain 
recognition of specifically Aboriginal rights and enacted legislation particu-
larly for Indigenous peoples, despite state opposition (Iorns Magallanes 
1999: 246; Fletcher 1999: 340).
 In the 1970s support grew for equal access to social services and limited 
self-determination for Indigenous communities (Markus 2001: 21). Self-
determination was predicated on principles for decolonization identified by 
the UN, ‘that all people have the right to cultural freedom, to exercise choice 
over their own lives and to be free from coercion’. This is reflected in Article 
1 of the ICCPR: ‘All people have the right to self-determination. By virtue 
of the right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural developments’. In Australia, self-determi-
nation implies solidarity, empowerment and enhanced life chances; its 
broader international connotation of self-governing autonomy is rejected 
(Fletcher 1999: 342–3). Nonetheless, increased recognition of Indigenous 
aspirations led to the first Aboriginal Land Rights (NT) legislation, initiated 
under the Whitlam government and enacted in 1976. The administration of 
Aboriginal affairs was reorganized under Whitlam who established the Com-
monwealth Department of Aboriginal Affairs in 1972; the House of Repre-
sentatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and National 
Aboriginal Consultative Committee in 1973; and the Aboriginal Land Fund 
Commission in 1975 (Fletcher 1999: 343–4; Tickner 2001: 13, 14, 27; 
Markus 2001: 22).
 The Hawke and Keating Labor governments, 1983 to 1996, promoted 
social justice (Fletcher 1999: 336). The Community Development Employ-
ment Project, begun in 1977 under the Fraser government to provide work 
in remote communities, was expanded under Hawke (Tickner 2001: 18). 
Bob Hawke was committed to commercial land acquisition for dispossessed 
Aborigines and enhancing their rights, particularly to veto mining on their 
lands. Apart from South Australia, state governments failed to legislate ade-
quately in this area. Clyde Holding, Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, enacted 
the first Commonwealth Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage leg-
islation in 1986. Uluru and Kata Tjuta, spectacular landscapes excised from 
Aboriginal reserves and incorporated into a national park, were returned to 
Aboriginal ownership in 1985 with future lease-back and joint management 
arrangements (Tickner 2001: 21–4).
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 Indigenous cultural heritage is intertwined with spirituality and place. 
Often it is secret, sacred and gender specific. Several conflicts between this 
largely intangible, mystical culture and industrial and commercial interests 
have led to misunderstandings and double standards, exemplified by the 
Hindmarsh Island Bridge case in South Australia (Tickner 2001: Ch.13). 
When, in the face of disagreement amongst local Indigenous women, the 
1995 Hindmarsh Island Bridge Royal Commission found that Ngarrindjeri 
women’s beliefs were fabricated, Dodson responded vehemently:
The right to religious freedom and respect for spiritual beliefs lies at the 
heart of human rights. It is a right which all Australians are obliged to 
respect, and all Australians entitled to enjoy. And that principle holds 
irrespective of whose beliefs are at issue, or on what basis those beliefs 
are held. What we have in this Royal Commission is the abuse of human 
rights of Aboriginal people masquerading as a lofty legal procedure.
(cited in Tickner 2001: 283)
On Australia Day, 1988, most Australians celebrated 200 years of European 
settlement while Aborigines protested with the slogan ‘White Australia has 
a black history’. In June, Hawke was presented with the historic Barunga 
Statement requesting government support for an International Declaration of 
Principles for Indigenous Rights. In response, Hawke promised a treaty. While 
treaties exist elsewhere, in Australia there was concern that this would divide 
the nation. The idea was repeatedly raised but never seriously entertained by 
later governments (Tickner 2001: 25–6, 40–2; Markus 2001: 87).
 Hawke responded actively to the Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody (RCADIC), appointing Dodson as Australia’s first Abo-
riginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner. He strength-
ened the capacity of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
(HREOC) to inform Indigenous communities about their rights and 
improved mechanisms for handling complaints under the first Optional Pro-
tocol to the ICCPR (Tickner 2001: ix, Ch.4). These measures had little 
impact on the disadvantage underlying deaths in custody, a situation exacer-
bated in the 1990s by Western Australia’s juvenile justice legislation and 
the NT’s mandatory sentencing which contravened the recommendations 
of the RCADIC and violated the Convention of the Rights of the Child 
and the ICCPR (Tickner 2001: 79–80, 306; Markus 2001: 110–11; Wells 
2000: 215).
 In a clear move towards self-determination and in line with international 
developments in Indigenous human rights, Hawke created the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) in 1989, through which 
Indigenous Australians could participate in government processes affecting 
their lives. ATSIC had a distinctive structure for managing cultural differ-
ence through joint accountability (Havemann 1999c: 332) and was politi-
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cally very significant (Tickner 2001: 49). It was to be the voice of Indigenous 
peoples: promoting self-determination by formulating, implementing and 
monitoring programmes; advising the Minister; developing policy; assisting 
and cooperating with communities; improving social conditions; protecting 
cultural material; conducting research; and empowering Aborigines through 
devolution and self-management (Fleras 1999: 216; Markus 2001: 36). It 
was given considerable resources and autonomy.
 Throughout the 1990s, Australians were engaged in a national debate 
about their history, ‘the history wars’ (Macintyre and Clark 2003), especially 
the relationship between Indigenous Australians and European colonizers. 
The Hawke and Keating governments established a reconciliation process 
urging public acknowledgement of the legacy of invasion, dispossession and 
assimilation (Reynolds 1999: 129; Tickner 2001: 27–47). A Reconciliation 
Council was formed in 1991. For Robert Tickner, Minister in the Indigen-
ous affairs portfolio, 1990–1996, its objectives were threefold: to educate 
non-Indigenous Australians about Indigenous history and culture and the 
need to address Indigenous disadvantage and human rights; to produce a 
formal document or agreement; and to actively address Indigenous aspira-
tions, human rights and social justice. Tickner argued that advancing these 
objectives was a precondition of any celebration of Australian nationhood in 
2001 (Tickner 2001: 29, 33, 45, 47). On 27 May 1992, the 25th anniver-
sary of the 1967 referendum, parliament passed a motion supporting recon-
ciliation and the government’s response to RCADIC, including the principle 
of self-determination (Tickner 2001: 42). Paul Keating’s landmark Redfern 
speech on 10 December 1992 was a public acknowledgement by the Prime 
Minister of Aboriginal human rights abuses, delivered at the Australian 
launch of the UN International Year of the World’s Indigenous People in 
1993:
If we can build a prosperous and remarkably harmonious multicultural 
society in Australia, surely we can find just solutions to the problems 
which beset the first Australians – the people to whom the most injus-
tice has been done . . . the starting point might be to recognise that the 
problem starts with us non-Aboriginal Australians. It begins, I think, 
with the act of recognition. Recognition that it was we who did the dis-
possessing. We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional 
way of life. We brought the disasters. The alcohol. We committed the 
murders. We took the children from their mothers. We practised dis-
crimination and exclusion. It was our ignorance and our prejudice.
(cited in Fletcher 1999: 336; Tickner 2001: 95; Markus 2001: 37)
Prominent conservatives, including Tim Fischer, National Party leader, John 
Stone, ex-National Party senator, and Hugh Morgan, Western Mining’s 
Chief Executive Officer, publicly opposed Keating’s stance (Tickner 2001: 
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97–9, 107–8; Markus 2001: Chs 3–4). John Howard, leader of the Liberal–
National Party Coalition, rejected the notion that Australia had a racist past 
and denounced the ‘black armband version’ of Australia’s history (Reynolds 
1999: 129). In 1996, Howard proclaimed:
I sympathise fundamentally with Australians who are insulted when 
they are told that we have a racist bigoted past. . . . Now, of course, we 
treated Aborigines very, very badly in the past . . . but to tell children 
whose parents were no part of that maltreatment . . . who themselves 
have been no part of it, that we’re all a part of a, sort of, racist bigoted 
history, is something that Australians reject.
(cited in Fletcher 1999: 336; Markus 2001: 86)
Henry Reynolds (1999: 129) identifies the Mabo judgment as the main cause 
of the ‘history wars’. Similarly Augie Fleras (1999: 213) describes Mabo as a 
‘defining moment’ in Aboriginal ethno-politics. After wide consultation 
with Indigenous representatives and much political wrangling with state 
and Territory governments and the mining industry, the Keating govern-
ment passed the 1993 Native Title Act, acknowledging Aboriginal title as 
common law where not explicitly extinguished by crown or law (Tickner 
2001: Chs 7 and 8). In 1995, a Land Fund was established for the 95 per 
cent of Indigenous Australians unable to prove possession of, or continuous 
connection with land (Reynolds 1999: 129–39; Fleras 1999: 213; Tickner 
2001: Ch.11; Markus 2001: 39). Other policy responses to Mabo followed, 
promoting fairness, equality and better access to government systems. The 
1996 High Court Wik decision determined that native title could coexist 
with existing pastoral leases where previously it was extinguished (Tickner 
2001: Chs 7 and 8; Markus 2001: 42). In response, Howard released his 
10-Point Plan, arguing: ‘The fact is that the Wik decision pushed the pen-
dulum too far in the Aboriginal direction. The 10-point plan will return the 
pendulum to the centre’ (Australian Politics.com). Tickner considered this a 
new attack on Indigenous human rights (Tickner 2001: 308).
 Mabo’s significance is disputed as it simply recognized a pre-existing legal 
right based on Indigenous customs and occupancy. Placing the onus of proof 
on Aborigines, continuing to see land ownership from a Eurocentric perspec-
tive rather than a holistic Indigenous one, and the widespread dismissal 
of the Act created obstacles. Dodson argues that Australian governments 
remain ‘locked in a terra nullius mindset’, unwilling to renegotiate 
 Aboriginal–Crown relationships (cited in Fleras 1999: 213–15). Social ineq-
uities persist: staggering death rates, high unemployment, low standards of 
education, health and housing, and disproportionate incarceration rates. Indi-
genous identities, cultures and languages remain threatened and human 
rights discourse has shifted firmly towards self-determination, sovereignty 
and reconciliation.
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 Fleras (1999: 215–16) argues that Aboriginal ethno-politics have been 
relatively successful because Indigenous rights have been presented as human 
rights and Aboriginal socio-economic disadvantage linked with a national 
crisis requiring immediate attention. He attributes this to Indigenous activ-
ism that rejects inclusion in a multicultural society, favouring a conception 
of Aborigines as nations distinct from other Australians; the treatment of 
Aborigines in custody; international embarrassment over images of dispos-
sessed Aborigines; and increasing awareness of past discrimination.
 Such activism is exemplified in the push since the late 1980s, albeit 
unsuccessful, by Torres Strait Islanders for greater independence (Tickner 
2001: Ch.12). While the Queensland and Commonwealth governments 
opposed this, Hawke established an Interdepartmental Committee to con-
sider Torres Strait Islander grievances: loss of control over their future, dis-
advantage, and disregard for their cultural identity. In April 1993, an Island 
Coordinating Council document argued for self-determination by 2001:
Many Australians do not understand that Indigenous autonomy is a 
recognized world standard for public policy. Indigenous peoples are not 
simply another group to be assimilated. Rather we are distinct cultures 
with a will to survive and thrive on our traditional territories. There is 
irony in the fact that in order to participate fully in the opportunities 
and life of Australia, we need more autonomy and self-government. . . . 
Our purpose is not to import or copy a foreign model but to recognise 
that practical models exist and that the dangers in Indigenous autonomy 
and self-government feared by some Australians have not occurred 
elsewhere.
(Tickner 2001: 243–4)
Despite the establishment of the Torres Strait Regional Authority in 1994 
and existing local models in Norfolk, Christmas and Cocos-Keeling Islands, 
Australian governments have rejected devolution of power to Torres Strait 
Islanders. (Tickner 2001: 248).
 Overall, the Hawke–Keating Labor governments effected considerable 
change in the relationship with Indigenous Australians, enhancing their 
human rights protection, initiating a path to reconciliation, and launching 
the HREOC Enquiry into the ‘stolen generations’ in 1995 (Havemann 
1999c: 332). In 1996, however, Labor lost power to the Liberal–National 
Coalition. Ambivalent towards Labor’s Indigenous affairs policies, the Coali-
tion withdrew its support, ignoring international human rights trends and 
confining Indigenous Australians to the status of other minorities within its 
multicultural society. It failed to follow the social justice agenda of the 
Reconciliation Council and abandoned Labor’s third-stage response to the 
Native Title Act. It ignored Indigenous claims for differentiated citizenship, 
replacing the term ‘self-determination’ with ‘self-management’ or ‘self-
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empowerment’, which have no standing in national or international law 
(Havemann 1999c: 332; Tickner 2001: 45–7, 307; Wells 2000: 212). The 
1997 Bringing Them Home Report recommendation for a government 
apology to the ‘stolen generations’ was rejected. Under mounting pressure in 
1999, Howard expressed ‘deep and sincere regret’ but fell short of saying 
‘sorry’ for fear of compensation claims (Tickner 2001: 56–7). This resulted 
in censure from both the UN Commission on Human Rights and the CERD 
in 2000.
 The Howard government drastically reduced ATSIC’s funding and auton-
omy, and community programmes were adversely affected by pressure for 
improved accountability. The Coalition was sceptical about Indigenous 
demands for inherent and collective rights with the Minister increasingly 
seen as indifferent. Indigenous participation in self-governance declined 
owing to increasing racial intolerance and impatience with political correct-
ness (Fletcher 1999: 347). Pauline Hanson, leader of the ultra-conservative 
One Nation Party, promised to abolish special Indigenous rights during the 
1996 election campaign. Her emphasis on equal rights for all, supported by 
Howard, alienated Indigenous Australians (Fleras 1999: 217; Markus 2001: 
156, 193–4). Concern over the implications of Mabo and Wik, particularly 
any suggestion of an Aboriginal state, led to a steady erosion of post-Mabo 
Native Title Act rights. The pace of reconciliation was slow and Australia 
celebrated the centenary of federation with little progress, despite thousands 
of Australians symbolically walking over bridges the previous year. On 1 
January 2001, the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation ceased to exist 
(Tickner 2001: x; Markus 2001: 112).
 While ATSIC promised much in terms of social justice, it was increas-
ingly engulfed in scandal and litigation. Success was compromised by self-
management policies which duplicated state and regional structures; lack of 
accountability; and charges of favouritism and paternalism. Howard estab-
lished the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services (ATSIS) and during 
the 2004 election campaign, announced plans to restructure Indigenous 
affairs and abolish ATSIC. Contrary to recommendations of a government 
review in 2002, ATSIC was formally abolished on 24 March 2005 (Pratt and 
Bennett: 2004–2005).
 Fleras (1999: 218) argues that Australian ethno-political battles post-
Mabo included a commitment to self-sufficiency and cultural survival within 
the context of self-determination. A comparison across the settler dominions 
led him to identify certain themes. Above all, he emphasizes that ‘indigen-
ous peoples are not multicultural minorities’. Their concerns are not those of 
newcomers, striving for equality and an end to discrimination within exist-
ing structures of host societies. Rather, as descendants of the original inhab-
itants, their inherent and collective rights to self-determination have never 
been extinguished and await reactivation as the basis for negotiating a new 
relationship with the state. Their claims transcend the socio-cultural concerns 
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of immigrants and refugees. Unlike other minorities, they have a special rela-
tionship with the state and collective entitlements that flow from that rela-
tionship. They see themselves as ‘peoples’ or ‘nations within’ as described at 
the outset of this chapter, and their task as decolonization, demarginaliza-
tion and self-determination (Fleras 1999: 196, 219–20).
 Fleras’s argument highlights the delicate balance in settler societies 
between preserving the heritage of different cultural groups, managing their 
diversity, and recognizing Indigenous rights. Indigenous Australians clearly 
distinguish themselves from other minorities. Their inherent rights are 
essentially about self-determination, not necessarily confined to existing 
political frameworks. As Dodson explains:
Policy makers must accept that indigenous people are not a special cat-
egory of disadvantaged souls who require attention or even caring or 
gentleness. We are peoples with rights and imperatives of our own. Our 
principal right is to make the decisions that direct our present and our 
future.
(cited in Fleras 1999: 196)
Settler nations manage their cultural diversity by encouraging minorities to 
coexist with a shared set of responsibilities and core values. They oppose the 
Indigenous agenda of self-determination for fear of threatening national 
integrity. They reject the idea of differentiated citizenship, preferring uni-
versal individual rights to the shared sovereignty and collective rights to 
which Indigenous peoples aspire. Their responses to international laws and 
conventions are strongly influenced by these prevailing views.
Conclusion
Despite gains in recent decades and the reconciliation agenda, little progress 
has been made in Australia on Indigenous human rights and disadvantage. 
Arguably, Australia has breached its obligations under the CERD, ICCPR, 
ICESCR, the Convention against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (Tickner 2001: 308–10). A critical issue since the establishment of the 
WGIP has been how far nations are prepared to accept the concept of self-
determination. Increasingly contested in international law, this concept is one 
which Indigenous people consider central to the Universal Declaration of the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Fleras 1999: 221–2; Tickner 2001: 306). The settler 
societies, however, are simply not endorsing it. At the UN General Assembly 
in September 2007, 144 nations voted for the Declaration, 11 abstained and 
only four voted against – the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Aus-
tralia. In a public lecture in October 2007, Mick Dodson, by then Professor 
and Director of the Australian National University’s Centre for Indigenous 
Studies, referred to the result as an amazing international consensus.
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 Settler societies are therefore clearly out of step, as in their non-ratifica-
tion of other UN instruments such as the Conventions for the Safeguarding of 
the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003), and Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005). Admittedly, they are the nations most 
affected. Yet Dodson (2007) emphasized that the Declaration represents 
minimum standards for the treatment of Indigenous peoples. ‘This is the 
floor not the ceiling.’ Like other international instruments, it is ‘not legally 
binding but aspirational, a call to good behaviour’, replete with words such 
as ‘consultation’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘partnerships’. Somewhat sarcastically, 
Dodson outlined Australia’s stated objections, quoting Mal Brough, then 
Minister for Indigenous Affairs, who justified Australia’s position as follows: 
‘It’s not fair. It refers to specific groups and not others. It’s outside what we 
Australians believe to be fair. We did this because of Australia’s interest. We 
are all one under the national flag.’ Dodson argues that the government 
feared the Declaration would again raise questions of compensation. Austral-
ia’s objections relate specifically to Articles 25, 26 and 27, all of which 
concern the rights of Indigenous peoples to lands, territories, waters and 
other resources they have traditionally owned, occupied, used or acquired. 
Ironically, Australia was a leader in supporting the Draft Declaration for 
over two decades. Australian representatives were fully engaged in the delib-
erations of the WGIP with numerous opportunities to shape its final form. 
For over a decade, Dodson himself participated in its drafting. ‘It is not as if 
there had been no chance to ensure that it was fair’ (Dodson 2007).
 More recent developments may influence future relations between Indi-
genous and non-Indigenous Australians. The first was the Howard govern-
ment’s emergency response to the NT Report ‘Little Children are Sacred’ on 
child sexual abuse (NT Government 2007). Legislation in August 2007 
allowed comprehensive, compulsory intervention in 73 NT Aboriginal com-
munities. This occurred with little consultation with the NT government or 
Indigenous leaders, disregarding the importance of Aboriginal input into 
decisions affecting their lives (Brennan 2007: 1). It is an issue which contin-
ued to be controversial under Kevin Rudd’s Labor government which main-
tained the intervention.
 The second was the first ever Indigenous opening of parliament under the 
new Rudd government on 13 February 2008 and the historic apology by the 
Prime Minister to the ‘stolen generations’ as his first parliamentary act (ABC 
2008). Then on 3 April 2009, 16 months after taking power, Rudd acted 
upon Labor’s election promise to endorse the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous Affairs Minister Jenny Macklin declared this was 
an important symbolic step for building trust and ‘resetting’ black and white 
relations in Australia but she hastened to emphasize that it did not bestow any 
additional rights on Aboriginal Australians (The Age, 26 March, 3 April 2009). 
While these were long overdue positive gestures, they only partly address 
ongoing Indigenous aspirations for special rights and self-determination.
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